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The influence on export performance of performance 






Purpose – This study examines the extent to which exporter difficulties in evaluating foreign 
sales agent performance affect export performance, either directly or as mediated by 
opportunism. 
Methodology – In developing the hypotheses, the study integrates transaction cost theory and 
principal-agent theory. The proposed relationships between the constructs (performance 
ambiguity, opportunism, and export performance) are examined for a multi-industry sample of 
Norwegian exporters in their dealings with foreign sales agents. A survey of 410 qualified key 
informants yielded 101 usable questionnaires—a response rate of 24.6%. Structural equation 
modelling is used for data analysis and hypothesis testing.  
Findings – The analysis finds support for the hypothesis that sales agent performance 
ambiguity relates negatively to export performance. While performance ambiguity is positively 
related to sales agent opportunistic behavior, opportunism does not significantly influence 
export performance. It seems that the adaptation costs created by the evaluation problem are of 
greater importance in reducing export performance than the costs created by opportunistic 
behavior. 
Research limitations and implications – In focusing on the core dimensions of sales agent 
performance in foreign markets, other factors influencing export performance are not included. 
The fact that small Norwegian firms dominate the sample, further limits application and 
generalization of the findings. Nevertheless, the study provides export managers and scholars 
with a more thorough understanding of basic potentially deteriorating dimensions in the 
relationship between exporter and foreign independent sales agent. 
Originality/value – To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine how 
performance ambiguity and opportunistic behavior among foreign sales agents impact on export 
performance. By concentrating on basic deteriorating dimensions, the study adds to the few that 
focus on inhibiting drivers of exporter – foreign-sales-agent relationships. 
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The increasing globalization of economies, and growing worldwide competition, 
motivate firms to grow beyond their home market. The most popular way to expand across 
borders is simply by exporting (Leonidou and Katsikeas, 2010). According to The World Bank1, 
the influence of exporting on world gross product has shown a steady growth from 12% in 1960 
to 28% in 2016. Because of the importance of exports in creating economic value, an 
understanding of the drivers of firms’ competitiveness in foreign markets must encompass the 
factors that affect firms’ ability to compete in export markets (Morgan et al., 2012; Cavusgil 
and Zou, 1994). 
Anderson and Jap (2005) demonstrate that the development of ongoing relationships is 
heavily influenced by inhibiting, or deteriorating factors embedded in the history of 
relationships. The authors refer to the many and varied alliance types that are formed, and the 
fact that 30-60 % of them fail, motivating the authors to elaborate on reasons why so many 
close relationships underperform, or eventually break down altogether. Based on several 
studies, and in particular a recent dyadic examination of established relationships, Anderson 
and Jap (2005) choose to elaborate on inhibiting drivers of relationship performance. They 
(2005, p. 76) argue that close relationships may deteriorate in terms of the ”the dark side of 
relationships”; i.e. ”forces of destruction” of close relationships and state: “Relationships that 
appear to do well are the most vulnerable to the forces of destruction that are quietly building 
beneath the surface of the relationship”. As Anderson and Jap (2005) report in their study, 
opportunism is one main force of relationship destruction. They also indicate that the risk of 
opportunism may increase, as the exchange partners learn how to exploit information 
asymmetry between them. 
Obadia and Vida (2011) discuss weaknesses in previous research that focuses 
explanatory factors leading to export performance, and the common results in previous research 
indicating that socialization is almost always associated with better performance. The authors 
put forward arguments by researchers who believe that poor relationships impact negatively on 
performance. Furthermore, Anderson and Vida (2011) call for more research of the negative 
influence of relationships on performance. In particular, Obadia and Vida (2011) maintain that 
it would be worth examining whether the negative effect of relationships on performance occurs 
through opportunism.  
The concept of export modes usually encompasses foreign distributors and sales agents 
(Hollensen, 2014), and enabling as well as inhibiting factors affect a company’s 
competitiveness in foreign markets. However, previous research in the export performance 
literature, international strategic alliance literature, or export performance literature adapting 
the relational paradigm, seem to focus on positive or enabling drivers of export performance, 
thus ignoring inhibiting factors that may affect the ability to compete in export markets. And in 
spite of the importance of foreign sales agents in creating and sustaining economic value, 
foreign sales agents as an export mode is rarely focused upon in previous research – or results 
pertaining to this export mode  are difficult to extract. In fact, foreign sales agents may 
contribute more to export performance than foreign distributors. Bello and Lohtia (1995) found 
that exporters using foreign distributors experience greater environmental uncertainty (i.e. 
 
1 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS (Read September 2018) 
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diversity) than the use of sales agents, and that the use of agents contributes more to export 
performance than the use of distributors.  
The much-cited export literature reviews of Aaby and Slater (1989), Zou and Stan 
(1998), Katsikeas et al. (2000), Souza et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2016), are comprehensive, 
but do not report the results of studies on antecedents of independent foreign sales agent 
performance or report on negative, or inhibiting, drivers of export performance. Moreover, as 
shown by Christoffersen (2013) in his review of antecedents of international strategic alliance 
performance, or the review by Athanasopoulou (2009) of concepts used and research models 
within relationship literature, previous studies do not seem to include inhibiting drivers of 
(export) performance – or explicitly examine how inhibiting factors may affect export 
performance within exporter – foreign-sales-agent relationships. 
The current study thus addresses this gap in the literature by using agency theory to 
analyze antecedents of export performance in cross border relationships encompassing 
exporters and contracted foreign sales agents. The exporter/foreign-sales-agent relationship 
reflects a typical principal-agent exchange (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bello and Gilliland, 
1997) in which the principal (the exporter) delegates some decision-making authority to the 
sales agent (the agent), while bearing the risk of failure. 
Contracting independent foreign sales agents may expose the exporter to performance 
ambiguity, which is defined by Ouchi (1979, p. 846) as the “clarity with which [agent] 
performance can be assessed”. That is, the exporter encounters performance ambiguity, because 
it can be difficult to evaluate the performance of a distant sales agent. The foreign sales agent’s 
acquired knowledge of customers and markets creates an information asymmetry between the 
exporter and the foreign sales agent, favoring the latter. Moreover, cultural differences, for 
example, aggravate the information asymmetry problem confronting the exporter. In fact, Ouchi 
(1979) explicitly mentions foreign service industries as an example of a context that constitutes 
high performance ambiguity. 
Information asymmetrically distributed between the exporter and the foreign sales agent 
may reduce relationship efficiency by introducing transaction costs in two ways. 1) Information 
asymmetry, favoring the sales agent, may encourage the agent to engage in opportunistic 
behavior by shirking (Williamson, 1985) and 2) the information asymmetry problem facing the 
exporter may cause adaptation costs due to misdirected efforts (Ghosh and John, 1999).  
The aim of the present study is to examine to what extent performance ambiguity 
influences export performance directly through misdirected efforts, or indirectly through 
shirking by the foreign sales agent. As far as the authors of the present research know, this is 
one of the first studies to examine the influence of performance ambiguity on opportunism and 
export performance among foreign sales agents, thus responding to the call for more work on 
the influence of negative relationships on performance by Obadia and Vida (2011). In addition, 
this study is of the first to focus on foreign sales agents as an explicit export mode. The use of 
an explicit export mode is necessary, because the various export modes, most often including 
foreign sales agents, distributors (or importers), have quite different characteristics. Sales agents 
do not take title to the goods or keep stock; they are paid on commission and do not bear the 
operational risk (Hollensen, 2014).  
This study contributes to theory within the control, governance, and relational exchange 
literatures. Performance ambiguity may influence the choice of controls, governance structures, 
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or dimensions that are vital to forming relationship quality. Moreover, the results should 
contribute to the opportunism debate, and provide managerial guidance in allocating resources 
to reducing information asymmetry in exporter/foreign-sales-agent relationships. 
The article is organized as follows: The next section presents the theoretical framework 
underpinning the choice of export performance antecedents in this study. A conceptualization 
of export performance is included, after which the research model is presented and then the 
development of hypotheses and research methodology. After reporting and discussing the 
results, the article contains conclusions and suggestions for future research.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
To elaborate on factors inhibiting export performance, this study integrates core 
dimensions within transaction cost analysis (TCA) and agency theory. Although TCA and 
agency theory are concerned, respectively with governance modes, or control modes, these 
theoretical avenues are implemented in previous research analyzing, for example, precursors of 
exchange partner commitment (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), degree of expectations of 
relationship continuity (Heide and John, 1992), export intermediary performance (Peng and 
York, 2001), or market selection (He et al., 2016). Moreover, TCA and the related agency 
theory focus on curbing transaction costs by prescribing governance, or control modes, that 
may reduce costs – or negative dimensions – in an exchange relationship. As such, these 
theories offer a suitable theoretical framework for analyzing factors inhibiting export 
performance. As pointed out of Shoham (1998), conceptual definitions of export performance 
in previous export performance research vary widely. Our study follows the recommendation 
of Shoham (1998, p. 72), using a three-dimensional export performance representation, namely 
“sales”, “profitability” and “change” in sales and profitability. 
Possible adaptation costs and those incurred by opportunism, created by the evaluation 
problem facing exporters, influence export performance. The evaluation problem and its 
consequences are included and discussed in transaction cost analysis and agent theory. The 
problems in evaluating a foreign sales agent’s performance may incur adaptation costs, as well 
as maladaptation costs. Williamson (1985), who argues that maladaptation implies considerable 
transaction costs because of haggling, or running costs due to misalignment, proposes 
adaptation and maladaptation as two ends of a continuum. Conversely, successful adaptation 
and alignment by collaborative efforts may minimize friction between two parties in an 
exchange.  
According to Williamson (1985; 1991), an exchange partner will practice opportunism 
based upon the existence of 1) specific assets – or dependence asymmetry, 2) external 
uncertainty, or 3) problems in evaluating partner performance (performance ambiguity). 
External uncertainty, such as market fluctuation and random market regulation, increases an 
exchange partner’s ability to impose a comprehensive contract that defines all relevant 
contingencies, thus allowing negative information asymmetry to arise and possibly increasing 
performance ambiguity as well. In both cases, a party experiencing favorable information 
asymmetry may be tempted to act opportunistically, particularly if the same party also 
experiences the other party being dependent on services rendered. 
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To accommodate the discussion of performance ambiguity and opportunism, transaction 
cost analysis is useful and concerned with the proposition that firms can reduce exchange costs 
and create economic value by choosing the most efficient governance mode. For example, the 
mode that results in the lowest transaction costs, given a specific transaction/exchange context 
characterized by the nature of specific assets invested by the exchange partners, depends on 
complexity (external uncertainty), bounded rationality, and information distributed 
asymmetrically between the exchange partners (Williamson, 1985). Uncertainty within an 
exchange relationship, and in the relationship environment, both create complexity and 
unpredictability.  
External uncertainty encompasses volatility and changes in the external environment of 
the firm that cannot be controlled (Klein et al., 1990). According to Williamson (1985), 
supported by bounded rationality, external uncertainty raises the issue of adaptation, as external 
uncertainty enhances information asymmetry and increases the potential for external partners 
to behave opportunistically (Klein et al., 1990). Internal uncertainty, or behavioral uncertainty, 
labeled by Heide (1994) as performance ambiguity, reflects the difficulties associated with 
monitoring the contractual performance of exchange partners (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  
Peng and York (2001, p. 329) argue that when expanding across borders, the ex post 
transaction costs in exporting ”are non-trivial” and export channels are chosen in order to 
minimize the costs. A major driver of ex post transaction costs is presented by Williamson 
(1985) as internal uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty, and by other theorists as performance 
ambiguity (Heide, 1994; Katsikeas et al., 2009). For Williamson (1985) and Ouchi (1979), 
performance ambiguity is uncertainty of a strategic kind – and is attributable to opportunism, 
because the agent may encounter moral hazard, due to the information asymmetry between the 
exchange partners, thus favoring the agent (Williamson, 1985). As such, opportunism may 
result in the agent not fulfilling the requirements of a contract, entailing reduced efficiency in 
an exchange relationship, and reduced value to the partners involved. However, performance 
ambiguity due to high monitoring costs, a lack of communication effort, or lack of knowledge 
of the exchange partner’s working conditions, may also result in difficuly adapting to an 
exchange partner’s working processes – resulting in adaptation costs because of information 
asymmetry leading to misdirected actions. As proposed by Skarmeas et al. (2002), turbulent 
market conditions allow negative information asymmetry to develop. In addition to possible 
opportunism costs, or in combination with them, misdirected actions can reduce exchange 
efficiency and value creation (Ghosh and John, 1999).  
Williamson (1988) argues that transaction cost analysis and agency theory are mainly 
complementary, and the importance of performance ambiguity as a possible antecedent of 
opportunism in exchange relationships is stressed by TCA theorists and agency theorists. Stump 
and Heide (1996) argue that difficulties in ascertaining the true level of performance are closely 
related to the information asymmetry between principal and agent. Bergen et al. (1992) suggest 
that the information asymmetry problem is the most important antecedent of agent opportunism. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
This study confirms the crucial role of information asymmetry between principal 
(exporter) and agent (foreign sales agent) in performance ambiguity problems facing the 
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principal (exporter). As in the research by Mishra et al. (1998), this study contends that 
performance ambiguity reflects the information asymmetry problem, formulating the 
hypotheses concerning information asymmetry as a problem of performance ambiguity.  
The current study assesses inhibiting drivers of export performance by considering the 
core constructs of performance ambiguity and opportunism as such drivers, as reflected in 
agency theory. The evaluation problem of foreign sales agent performance is anticipated to have 
a direct and negative effect on export performance by reducing value through maladaptation 
costs. Moreover, the evaluation problem related to foreign sales agent performance may attract 
opportunistic behavior by the foreign sales agent. Ultimately, opportunistic behavior by the 
foreign sales agent may result in decreased export performance, as perceived by the exporter. 
Against this background, the research model is outlined in Figure 1. Next, it is developed a 




Figure 1: Research model and anticipated interrelations between constructs 
 
Performance ambiguity and export performance 
Specialization and the division of labor are the main premises for the development of 
principal-agent theory. That is, “whenever an individual depends on the actions of another – an 
agency relationship arises” (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985, p. 2). Originating in the work of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980), agency theory focuses on issues related to the 
delegation of work, encompassing difficulties in assessing agent performance (performance 
ambiguity). Agency theorists explain these difficulties in terms of asymmetrically distributed 
information (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), and performance ambiguity is proposed to influence 
export performance directly as well as indirectly through opportunism, as shown in Figure 1. 
Williamson also characterized performance ambiguity as “secondary” (1985, p. 57), 
confining the evaluation problem to information or communication deficits, creating adaptation 
costs that are not necessarily related to a partner’s opportunistic behavior. In contrast to 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991), this form of performance ambiguity is acknowledged, for 
example, by Ghosh and John (1999). They maintain that performance ambiguity may lead to 
transaction costs or reduce value creation in two ways, firstly through ex post opportunistic 
behavior (shirking costs, Eisenhardt, 1989; Bergen et al., 1992; Mishra et al., 1999) and 
secondly through maladaptation or misdirected efforts, as described by Ghosh and John (1999).  
The transaction cost paradigm, or agency theory, seldom appear in analyses of export 
performance antecedents, as demonstrated by Chen et al. (2016). In contrast to earlier literature 
reviews, Chen et al. (2016) report the theoretical frameworks in the studies included in their 
survey of previous research 2006-2014 on antecedents of export performance.  The resource-
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based view dominates as a theoretical foundation (50 of the 109 reporting a theoretical 
framework), followed by contingency theory (13), institutional-based view (12), and 
organization learning theory (11). Only 4 of the 109 adopted transaction cost analysis/agency 
theory. Two of these concern internet marketing and internationalization, and as such, are 
irrelevant to this study. Of the remaining two studies, one may be representative of antecedents 
of performance ambiguity in crossing-border relationships. 
Nes et al., (2007), as the only one of the four studies, propose that cultural distance  
negatively influences the cross-border relationship. The authors examine how cultural distance 
impacts on export performance by reducing trust and communication, and thereby, relationship 
commitment. Subsequently, reduced commitment decreases export performance. The results 
support the argument that cultural distance relates negatively to trust and confidence in the 
foreign middleman and to communication. Commitment to the foreign middleman is positively 
related to export performance. However, the concept of foreign middleman is not specified in 
Nes et al. (2007).  
Cultural distance is one factor that may challenge communication with the foreign sales 
agent. Cultural differences increase the problems in assessing partner performance, establishing 
cultural difference as a close concept to performance ambiguity. As such, the results of Nes et 
al. (2007) support the argument that performance ambiguity affects export performance 
negatively. As pointed out by Nes et al. (2006), cultural differences increase difficulties in 
communicating and sharing information. Besides forcing the exporter to use subjective 
measures, cultural differences – as in the case of performance ambiguity – restrain the reliable 
input of sales agent performance, thereby increasing adaptation costs that affect export 
performance negatively. 
Athanasopoulou (2009), who critically analyzes 64 articles in the period 1987-2007 
concerning relationship quality (RQ), points to a possible link between performance ambiguity 
and export performance. One interesting result of the analysis is that the concept of opportunism 
is rarely included in RQ research. Nonetheless, one study does examine the influence of 
uncertainty, distance, and conflict on RQ dimensions such as adaptation, commitment, 
communication, cooperation, satisfaction, trust, and understanding (Leonidou et al. 2006). 
Their study is one of the few to investigate negative factors affecting the quality of relationships, 
using the empirical context of sellers in the USA who repor on their relationship with foreign 
importers. The authors explain that all three inhibiting drivers relate significantly to all RQ 
dimensions. In particular, uncertainty (using items reflecting both external and internal 
uncertainty) is strongly and negatively related to exporters’ perceived quality of adaptation. 
Leonidou et al. (2006, p. 582) also mention the various forms of uncertainty that seem to make 
exporters ”less sure about making adjustments on structural, processual, or other issues”. The 
results of this study support the argument that performance ambiguity (i.e. internal uncertainty) 
increases adaptation costs, reducing value creation/export performance. 
In the present context of exporters and independent foreign sales agents, the evaluation 
problem is especially important (Ouchi, 1979). This problem entails increased adaption costs 
(Nes et al., 2007; Leonidou et al., 2006), which in turn reduce efficiency and export 
performance. Ghosh and John (1999) posit that where there is an evaluation problem, the 
principal may fail to identify or implement the correct actions or may provide insufficient 
support in their relationship with the intermediary. This kind of adaptation problem can reduce 
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value creation in the exchange relationship with the intermediary, thus undermining export 
performance. On that basis, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H1: Performance ambiguity relates negatively to export performance. 
 
Performance ambiguity and opportunism 
Information asymmetry between partners increases the evaluation problem, raising the 
probability of opportunistic behavior, which is an empirically established phenomenon in 
exchange relationships (Hawkins et al., 2008). Opportunism, or self-interested behavior 
involving deceit (Williamson 1985), includes partner behaviors that actively or passively 
exploit the relationship to their own advantage (Wathne and Heide, 2000), restricting 
organizational outcomes (John, 1984) or value creation (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Opportunism 
is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) and is an important 
assumption of transaction cost theory (TCT). 
Given the frequent discussion of its antecedents, and of its outcomes, it is not surprising 
that opportunism has attracted growing research interest (e.g. Terpend et al., 2008). However, 
this construct is “seldom the central focus of most empirical research and given how common 
it is in the business press, further research is warranted” (Hawkins et al., 2008, p. 905). Among 
studies exploring the concept of opportunism, Moran and Ghoshal (1996) argue that it is 
necessary to distinguish between the mere inclination to behave opportunistically and the 
behavior itself. Ouchi (1979) maintains that norms may inhibit partner opportunism, and some 
scholars have argued that the presumption of opportunism reflects a “standard behavior” that 
may not reflect reality (Ouchi, 1979; Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009). Given the risk of 
opportunism in partnerships, misrepresentations of intent and refusals to honor agreements 
cannot be assumed away (John, 1984). Opportunistic behavior may therefore be related to 
performance ambiguity, varying in degree according to the difficulty of assessing partner 
performance. 
The concepts of performance ambiguity and opportunism focused on by transaction cost 
theory and agency theory are most often linked to the work of Williamson (1975, 1985, 1988, 
1989, 1991) and to the closely related agency theory discussed, for example, by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Eisenhardt (1989), and Bergen et al. (1992), and inspired by 
organization theorists such as Ouchi (1979, 1980).  
Performance ambiguity corresponds to the concept of internal uncertainty (Mishra et al., 
1998; Katsikeas et al., 2009). However, most discussions of performance ambiguity and 
opportunism refer to Williamson (1985), who maintains that performance ambiguity arises 
from difficulties in assessing adaptive, sequential decision making in exchanges with a partner. 
Moreover, Williamson (1985) asserts that the most critical form of performance ambiguity is 
also a strategic issue, as the evaluation problem may spur opportunistic behavior by partners in 
a relationship characterized by information asymmetry. This occurs in combination with the 
presumption of limited management capacity for rational action (bounded rationality).  
Few studies have investigated the influence of various forms of uncertainty on foreign 
partner opportunism (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2008; Li, 2002; Skarmeas et al. 2002). Of these 
studies, one focuses on foreign sales subsidiaries and two on foreign importers as partners in a 
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cross-cultural context. Although the results pertain to a different set of foreign intermediaries, 
compared to foreign sales agents, the results may indicate that performance ambiguity relates 
positively (also) to foreign sales agents. 
Hawkins et al.’s (2008) review of previous research on antecedents and outcomes of 
opportunism in buyer-seller relations and suggest that uncertainty influences opportunism. The 
authors argue that uncertainty is dependent on behavior or environment. Furthermore, the 
qualitative study by Li (2002) investigates opportunistic behavior among 15 established sales 
subsidiaries on the part of British manufacturers in China. Interestingly, Li (2002) points to the 
contrast between the identification of opportunistic behavior by the salespersons based in China 
and the fact that the British employers expressed great trust in them. Lee (2002) proposes that 
the high degree of opportunistic behavior relates to the high environmental uncertainty and lack 
of strong legal frameworks in this emerging market.  
Different cultural or business practices between exchange partners may develop 
information asymmetry, being drivers of performance ambiguity. Difficulties in understanding 
a foreign market culture or business in general make it harder to correctly assess sales agent 
performance (Klein et al., 1990; Lin-Yee and Ogunmokun, 2003), which may encourage 
foreign sales agents to engage in opportunistic behavior. 
Lee (1998) examines (among other constructs) how decision-making uncertainty relates 
to the foreign importer opportunism facing Australian exporters. Lee (1998) measures decision-
making uncertainty using three items, of which one touches on the concept of performance 
ambiguity (adequacy of available information). Lee (1998) finds that decision-making 
uncertainty and cultural distance relate positively to importer opportunism. The analysis by 
Skarmeas et al. (2002) yields results that point in the same direction. Skarmeas et al. (2002) 
examine to what extent exporter cultural sensitivity, and environmental volatility in the foreign 
market, influence importer opportunism. The results support the argument that cultural 
sensitivity, and environmental uncertainty, relate positively to foreign partner opportunism. 
The above research examines the relationship between exporters and foreign sales 
subsidiaries and importers from the exporter perspective. On the other hand, Katsikeas et al. 
(2009) use the perspective of the importer in exporter-importer relationships, arguing that 
internal uncertainty in the importer-exporter relationship relates positively to the level of 
exporter opportunism. Relying on Williamson (1985), Katsikeas et al. (2009) argue that internal 
uncertainty or performance ambiguity make it difficult to evaluate an exporter’s behavior. The 
authors maintain that difficulties in assessing exporter performance entail a reduced ability to 
collect and process relevant information, creating opportunities for the exporter to engage in 
opportunistic behavior and exploit the trading arrangements. However, Katsikeas et al. (2009) 
do not find support for the argument that internal uncertainty (i.e. performance ambiguity) 
affects exporter opportunism significantly.  
Our study examines post-contractual relations, often decribed in in agency theory as the 
hidden action problem, or moral hazard (Bergen et al., 1992). In line with transaction cost 
theorists, agency theory acknowledges the importance of information asymmetry between 
exchange partners, which tempts the more knowledgeable partner to engage in opportunistic 
behavior. In exporter/foreign-sales-agent relations, the latter has information that the exporter 
desires, but does not possess. The more exclusive information favoring the foreign sales agent 
may comprise, for example, knowledge of the foreign country culture, distribution networks, 
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customer behavior, or legal systems. The foreign sales agent possesses specific country and 
market information the foreign sales agent is reluctant to share with the exporter. 
In the case of foreign sales agents realizing that the exporter does not have adequate 
information to verify the sales agent’s behavior, the foreign sales agent is more likely to behave 
opportunistically, and to exploit the information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989). In other words, 
the problem of self-interest may motivate the foreign sales agent to engage in opportunistic 
behavior (Bergen et al., 1992). Although relating to different foreign partner, compared to 
foreign sales agents, the results of Li (2002), Klein et al. (1990), Lin-Yee and Ogunmokun 
(2003), Skarmeas et al. (2002), and Katsikeas et al. (2009) support the arguments made by 
agency theorists. Hence: 
 
H2: Performance ambiguity relates positively to opportunism 
 
Opportunism and export performance 
Williamson’s (1975) definition of opportunism refers to deceit and amorality. Wathne 
and Heide (2000) elaborate the concept of opportunism, forms of outcome, and solutions, by 
distinguishing between passive and active forms of opportunism. They note that although the 
party acting opportunistically may gain some short-term advantage, value creation for both will 
suffer in the long run. 
The concept of opportunism is seldom included as an antecedent of export performance 
in previous research. One exception is Parkhe (1993), in which the analysis yields results 
supporting the argument that perceived opportunism by a strategic alliance partner affects 
negatively the principal firm’s perception of alliance performance. Using the fulfilment of 
major strategic needs, and indirect performance measures such as overall performance 
assessment, as indicators of alliance performance, Parkhe (1993) shows that perceived 
opportunism relates negatively to perceived alliance performance. Although Parkhe (1993) 
does not specify which strategic alliances are included in the study, the results may support the 
argument that opportunistic behavior by foreign sales agents affects exporter performance 
negatively. 
This study adopts the moral hazard, or hidden action concept concerning opportunism 
(Bergen et al., 1992), and concentrates on the phenomenon of shirking. Shirking, as measured 
in this study, may reduce value to the exporter (reduce export performance) in several ways. 
Breaking promises indicates that the foreign sales agents do not make the necessary efforts to 
achieve sales goals, affecting export performance negatively. Similarly, the foreign sales agent 
may not focus adequately on customer support. Neglecting decreased customer sales reduces 
export performance. Moreover, Wathne and Heide (2000) maintain that all forms of 
opportunism have the potential to restrict value creation. If shirking is present, export 
performance probably decreases. Thus: 
 






The sample of Norwegian exporters ranged in size from 1 - 2495 employees. About 90% 
of these firms had fewer than 200 employees, with a mean of 98.6. Their average turnover is 
NOK 156.6 million per year (about USD 20 million). With the exception of a few large 
corporations, the sample is representative of Norwegian industry, where firms are relatively 
small compared to other Western industrialized countries. The location of foreign sales agents 
is dominated by European countries (55.5%), followed by the Far East (25.7%), US (7%), South 
America (5%), and African countries (6.8%). 
Foreign sales agents represent what Bello and Lohtia (1995) describe as a quasi-
integration mode, which Solberg and Nes (2002) argue has certain characteristics distinguishing 
this export mode from, for example, foreign sales subsidiaries or foreign distributors. Thus, 
Solberg and Nes (2002) argue that exporters usually have greater trust and control capabilities 
in the exchange with a foreign sales agent, compared to foreign distributors. The degree of trust 
and ability to control may impact on how inclined the foreign partner is to engage in 
opportunistic behavior, and may influence the level of information asymmetry between the co-
operating exchange partners.  
In the case of foreign sales agents, and in contrast to foreign distributors, the exporter is 
normally more involved with sales and customer negotiations, as the exporter does not take title 
of the goods until the customer has them in stock. In this way, the exporter has control of 
activities “part of the way” (Solberg and Nes, 2002, p. 357). Using foreign distributors, the 
exporter has very little control over activities, and as shown by Solberg and Nes (2002), the 
exporters report low trust in the distributors. Moreover, foreign sales agents may feel less 
inclined to engage in opportunistic behavior, because commission is their incentive, motivating 
the agents to make an effort in aligning to what the exporter expects (Li, 2002). 
 
Data collection procedure 
To collect the data, the first step was to establish a survey population of exporting firms, 
using Kompass Online and a Norwegian Trade Council directory of 2770 firms. The criteria for 
inclusion in the survey were 1) having a presence in more than two countries for more than 
three years, and 2) having a relationship with a foreign sales agent. With the help of six suitably 
trained bachelor students, all 2770 firms were contacted by telephone at least three times during 
the data collection stage to ascertain whether they met the survey criteria, to identify the most 
knowledgeable informant, and to motivate the informant to return the subsequently dispatched 
questionnaire. The informants finally selected were CEOs or VPs of International Affairs in 
Norwegian exporting firms, using purposive sampling as described by Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias (1992). Of the 2770 companies, 410 met the criteria and were willing to complete 
the questionnaire. To begin with, the questionnaire asked the key informant to choose one 
market in which their company had been operating for at least three years, and to focus on this 
particular market and on a particular sales agent operating in that market.  
From the 410 positive informants of wholly-owned departments, distributors, agents and 
other foreign constellations, the survey procedure yielded 101 export – foreign-sales-agent 
relationships with usable questionnaires. Non-response bias was tested by comparing early and 
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late responses, following recommendations from Armstrong and Overton (1977). Non-response 
bias was examined both for the sample as a whole and separately for the sub-samples under 
each variable. Using T-values, the analysis showed no significant differences between early 
responses (60% of the sample) and late responses (40%), both for the sample as a whole and 
for separate variables. 
 
Measurement development 
According to Williamson (1989, p. 149), “all measurement problems are traceable to a 
condition of information impactedness” that arises because of ex post information asymmetries, 
in this study favoring the foreign sales agent. When the exporter experiences information 
impactedness, or performance ambiguity, the ability to assess quality is severely limited 
(Mishra et al., 1998).  
Ouchi’s framework (1979, 1980), and the empirical contributions of Ouchi and Maguire 
(1975), constitute a vital theoretical perspective often embraced by agency theorists (e.g. 
Eisenhardt 1989; Stump and Heide 1996), elaborating the concept of “information 
impactedness”. For example, Ouchi 1979 illustrates performance ambiguity by using two 
dimensions: knowledge of the transformation process (procedural knowledge) and ability to 
measure outputs (outcome measurability). Low performance ambiguity is characterized by high 
procedural knowledge and high measurability of outcome. In their study, performance 
ambiguity reflects procedural knowledge as well as outcome measurability, adapting three 
items suggested by Stump and Heide (1996). 
Economic theory acknowledges opportunism as an endogenous variable (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000), defined as self-seeking effort with guile, a deliberately deceitful action 
(Williamson, 1985), thus indicating a lack of morality. However, as pointed out by Moran and 
Ghoshal (1996) and John (1984), individuals do not always behave opportunistically, even if 
the circumstances permit such behavior. The risk of opportunism is there, but refusals to honor 
agreements and misrepresentation of intentions cannot be taken for granted. 
As proposed by Bergen et al. (1992), opportunism may arise before the exporter and the 
foreign sales agent enter a relationship (a precontractual problem/a hidden information 
problem), or, as in this study – after the relationship has been established (a postcontractual 
problem/a hidden action problem). Opportunism reflects what Wathne and Heide (2000) refer 
to as an evasion of obligations, or shirking in existing – ongoing – relationships. The present 
study asks the informants to choose markets in which the principal firm has been operating for 
at least three years, so that the firm (the informant) assesses a post-contractual phase of an 
ongoing relationship. The three items used in the questionnaire encapsulate shirking as 
misreporting, breaking of promises made by the foreign sales agent (Dahlstrøm and Nygaard, 
1999), or not doing a good job with customers in the particular market (Bergen et al., 1992). 
Katsikeas et al. (2000, p. 493) argue that the concept of export performance “is one of 
the most widely researched but least understood and most contentious areas of international 
marketing”. Multiple ways of conceptualizing export performance are adopted in previous 
research (Katsikeas et al., 2000), comprising different measures, perspectives and goals. 
Previous export performance research seems to focus on: 1) various forms of measuring export 
success, such as export effectiveness, export efficiency, and export adaptiveness; on 2) using 
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market or financial performance measures; on 3) implementing an export venture perspective 
or an export function perspective; or on 4) using objective or subjective measures (Oliviera et 
al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2012; Madsen, 1987).  
In this study, the key informant in the exporting company focuses on a particular market 
in which the company has been established for at least three years, indicating that it is useful to 
adopt an export venture approach (Cavusgil and Zou, 1994; Morgan et al., 2004). Concerning 
the measurement of export success, the present study adopts the findings of Madsen (1987). He 
suggests three categories: profit, sales and change measures. The factor analysis of Shoham 
(1998) supports the categories proposed by Madsen (1987). The fourteen different performance 
measures load adequately on the three categories, explaining 82 % of the variance. 
Shoham’s (1998) analysis does not propose subjective measures of export performance, 
such as export managers’ level of satisfaction with the export venture in a particular market. 
The author stresses the difference between objective and subjective measures, maintaining the 
importance of objective measures when assessing the company’s performance relative to 
industry. However, objective measures are hard to obtain, because managers do not readily 
reveal objective measures of sales and profits in any market, due to confidentiality. 
Furthermore, managers’ perceived satisfaction with the export venture in the particular market 
is likely to be reliable, because the satisfaction concept includes the key informant’s view of 
strategic elements of success, such as market expansion, development in sales and profits 
(Cavusgil and Zou, 1994).  
The present study adopts the subjective approach to measuring export performance 
(Cavusgil and Zou, 1994; Morgan et al., 2004; Nes et al., 2007), comprising the degree of export 
manager satisfaction with profits and turnover, compared to the company turnover in global 
markets, and to sales development. 
A linguistic expert was engaged to formulate the questions in Norwegian, and the 
questionnaire was tested on key informants of the first 20 companies on the preliminary list. 
The pre-test, which included phone calls to check how well the questionnaire worked, indicated 
that there was no need for further adjustment. The measures used are presented in Table 2. 
 
ANALYSIS 
A structural equation modeling approach may be used to simultaneously examine both 
direct and indirect effects of predictive variables on the outcome. The method tests hypotheses 
about the relationships among observed and latent variables, incorporating both variables. 
Structural equation modeling is widely used in behavioral science (Kline 1998, Byrne 2001), 
and adopted here in order to investigate the role of export performance in international 
relationships. This methodology usually entails a confirmatory approach and can be separated 
into measurement models and structural models. The recommended two-step approach to 
model construction and testing was adopted (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) and uses SPSS 24 
and Mplus 8 statistical analytical software applications to evaluate the collected data. 
An exploratory factor analysis (not reported here) was executed and the items fall into 
three dimensions in accordance with those hypothesized. One of the opportunism items had a 
low factor loading and was therefore excluded for further analysis. To avoid common methods 
bias, Harman’s one-factor test was applied, as recommended by Podsakoff et al., (2003), with 
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all items entered into an exploratory factor analysis and forcing a load on one factor. Common 
method bias exists if any single factor accounts for most of the variance in the resulting factors. 
However, no single factor emerged in the analysis, and the first factor (eigenvalue = 3.1) only 
accounted for 38% of the total variance. 
Table 2 shows the confirmatory factor loading using varimax rotation, eigenvalues and 
variance explained by the factors. Since export performance is regarded as a categorical variable 
in the structural equation model, an estimator of weighted least squares-mean and variance 
adjusted (WLSMV) was used. Confirmatory factor analysis was performed for the items of 
latent constructs, so as to confirm the validity of the measurement model. The bivariate 
correlations for all the measured variables were computed to check for multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, the table shows means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha and correlations of 
the latent variables of performance ambiguity (PA), export performance (EP) and opportunism 
(OP). The results show that all items underlying the constructs in the study, yield three factors 
with eigenvalues greater than 1 and they load on the appropriate constructs.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
*Items/Constructs PA EP  OP 
Precise standards by which to assess the intermediary’s performance are 
unlikely to be available. 
.678   
Evaluating the intermediary’s performance is a highly subjective  
process 
.765   
It is difficult to determine whether agreed quality standards and 
specifications are adhered to 
.759   
We have reason to believe that the intermediary conceals information 
that is important to our company. 
  .909 
The intermediary has not lived up to what s/he promised when we 
entered into the relationship. 
  .603 
I have reason to believe that the agent does not follow up its 
customers well in this market 
  ns 
We are very satisfied with the turnover generated by this intermediary, 
compared to our company’s total turnover in global markets  
 .956  
We are unhappy with last year's sales growth in the market for which 
this agent is responsible for 
 .661  
We are very satisfied with the profits generated by this intermediary in 
this  particular market  
 .743  
Eigenvalues 3.50 1.30 1.21 
    
Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha .779 .708 .783 
Mean 3.403 3.505 4.014 
Standard Deviation 1.369 1.478 1.452 
    
Correlation of latent variables    
Performance ambiguity (PA)  .350** -.417** 
Opportunism (OP)   -.299** 
Export performance (EP)    
*All loadings below .4 are suppressed and the factor loadings are significant at the <.001 level **. Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate a positive correlation between performance 
ambiguity and opportunism, as well as a negative correlation between performance ambiguity 
and export performance, and between export performance and opportunism. All constructs 
exhibit acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s alpha > .7) and standard deviation is between 1.37 – 
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1.48. The items in Table 2 are used in a confirmatory factor analysis as a basis for the 
measurement model. Both the measurement and structural equation models can be considered 
as theoretically acceptable. The structural equation model has goodness-of-fit statistics such as 
a comparative fit index (CFI) of .969, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) of .949, the weighted root 
mean square residual (WRMR) is .415 and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
is .076, all better than the appropriate thresholds (Browne and Cudeck 1993).  
The structural equation model (SEM) indicates a strong negative relationship between 
performance ambiguity and export performance, as well as a strong positive relationship 
between performance ambiguity and opportunism. Opportunism also relates negatively to 
export performance, although the negative impact is not significant. Table 4 sets out the 
hypotheses and the results of the SEM analysis: 
 
Table 2: Hypotheses and results 
Hypothesis β value p-value Support 
H1: Performance ambiguity → Export performance   -.481 .002 Yes 
H2: Performance ambiguity → Opportunism .478 .001 Yes 
H3: Opportunism → Export performance -.069 .677 No 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The aim of the present study is to examine to what extent performance ambiguity 
influences export performance directly through misdirected efforts, or indirectly through 
shirking by the foreign sales agent. The results support H1 and H2. Performance ambiguity 
relates negatively to export performance, and positively to sales agent opportunism. On the 
other hand, H3 is not supported. Sales agent opportunism does not seem to influence export 
behavior negatively, compared to the difficulties in evaluating sales agent performance. The 
results confirm the importance of the evaluation problem in relation to independent sales agent 
performance in international relationships. The literature review identified only one previous 
study that focuses on performance ambiguity, testing the influence of customer performance 
ambiguity on strategies in outlet-customer and outlet-employee relationships (Mishra et al., 
1998). As far as we know, the present study is the first to examine the importance of 
performance ambiguity in an international business-to-business context, in relation to 
opportunism and export performance. 
This study offers new insights into understanding cross-border relationships 
encompassing exporter/foreign-sales-agent exchanges. The study contributes to the export 
performance literature by highlighting the roles of performance ambiguity and information 
asymmetry when creating value in exporter/foreign-sales-agent exchange relationships. The 
problem of ambiguity associated with the assessment of foreign sales agent performance seems 
to reduce export performance, and outweighs the possible inhibiting effect on export 
performance from foreign sales agent opportunism.  
The results of the current study support the original assumption made by Williamson 
(1985), that performance ambiguity may lead to opportunistic behavior who is evaluated. 
However, previous research shows no consistent validation of this proposed inter-logic between 
performance ambiguity and opportunism, which suggests that further examination is needed. 
For example, Katsikeas et al. (2009) incorporate the concepts of performance ambiguity (which 
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they refer to as internal uncertainty) and opportunism in their investigation of how relational 
dimensions affect performance. Their analysis supports the argument that internal uncertainty 
(i.e., performance ambiguity) concerning manufacturer performance, relates negatively to 
distributor trust in the manufacturer, but fails to establish a relationship between performance 
ambiguity and opportunistic behavior on the part of the manufacturer. Katsikeas et al. (2009) 
do not investigate the effects on performance of misdirected efforts or opportunism caused by 
performance ambiguity. 
The results of our study support the argument of Ghosh and John (1999) and Wathne 
and Heide (2000), that difficulty in evaluating a partner’s performance - in this case, a foreign 
sales agent - may lead to misdirected actions or insufficient support of the exporter’s dealings 
with the sales agent, entailing a reduction in value (i.e., in export performance). However, the 
hypothesis predicting the negative influence of sales agent opportunism on export performance 
is not supported. The lack of any significant relationship between opportunism and performance 
supports those who argue that the importance of opportunism may be overstated in the literature 
(Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009). Moreover, the results indicate the presence of mediating 
variables that may further explain the inhibiting effect of opportunism on export performance. 
For example, opportunistic behavior by a foreign sales agent (or by other intermediaries) 
reflects reduced commitment by the foreign sales agent, ultimately affecting export 
performance negatively. Skarmeas et al. (2002) and Nes et al. (2007) indicate the importance 
of mediating variables such as trust and commitment. 
Skarmeas et al. (2002) examine to what extent exporter cultural sensitivity, and 
environmental volatility in the foreign market, influence importer opportunism. The results of 
their study support the argument that cultural sensitivity and environmental uncertainty relate 
positively to opportunism. Skarmeas et al. (2002) do not examine the direct effects of 
opportunism on performance, using importer commitment as an intermediate variable. The 
performance measure focuses on the importer’s assessment of the relationship with the 
exporter. Furthermore, importer commitment relates positively to relationship performance for 
the importer. Skarmeas et al. (2002) point to the possibility that evaluation problems do affect 
opportunism positively, but that the negative effect of opportunism on export performance may 
be caused by reduced trust and commitment. 
The link between performance ambiguity and export performance changes the picture, 
reducing the relative importance of sales agent opportunism. Interestingly, the influence of 
performance ambiguity is greater than that of foreign sales agent opportunism, which indicates 
that opportunism is less important than adaptation problems in relation to transaction costs. 
Moreover, the relatively larger influence of the adaptation problem caused by performance 
ambiguity indicates that the secondary behavioral uncertainty discussed in Williamson (1985, 
1975) should have been acknowledged more in some of the control and governance literature.  
Much previous research concentrates only on distributors/importers in export 
performance research or international strategic alliance research, or does not specify which 
export mode/entry mode is included in the investigation. The lack of specification of modes, 
and dominant focus on distributors/importers, neglects the fact that different modes have 
differing characteristics, possibly affecting the presence, antecedents and outcomes of 
behavioral attributes (e.g. Solberg and Nes, 2002).  
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Obadia and Vida (2011, p. 473) argue that until now, very few researchers in the export 
field have attempted to counter the conviction that “the closer the relationship, the more positive 
the outcome”. Obadia and Vida (2011) maintain that their results tell different story, in which 
close relationships may have positive effects, but can also hamper economic performance. 
Possible inhibiting relationship drivers, such as opportunism in long-term export-foreign sales 
department relations, are also indicated by, for example, Anderson and Jap (2005). The analysis 
in this study adds support to the argument that inhibiting drivers of relationship efficiency may 
arise even in export/foreign-sales-agent relationships that have existed for a long time. The 
mean relationship length in the present study is 9.77 years. 
The observed importance of performance ambiguity in international business 
relationships and the observed interconnection (or lack thereof) between the constructs explored 
here also contributes to theory in the control, governance, and relational exchange literatures. 
For example, performance ambiguity may influence the choice of controls or governance 
structures, as well as concepts influencing relationship quality.  
The results of the present analysis seem to support the view that performance ambiguity 
is a dominant precursor of export performance (even compared to opportunism), underscoring 
the importance of management efforts to acquire adequate knowledge of factors that may 
contribute to or reduce performance ambiguity. The emphasis on performance ambiguity and 
opportunism as inhibiting drivers of exporter/foreign-sales-agent relationship development 
contributes to management practice by highlighting the importance of performance ambiguity 
in decreasing export performance directly, mostly because of adaption problems. Managers in 
exporting firms should acknowledge the evaluation problem, directing resources to reducing 
information asymmetry. However, as in the case of the Norwegian exporting firms included in 
this study, small and medium-sized firms may have scarce resources that must be efficiently 
allocated. Hence, it is important to identify and adopt appropriate activities in the relationship 
with the foreign sales agent, such as socialization. On the other hand, socialization also requires 
efforts from the exporter. Wathne and Heide (2000) discuss strategies for managing 
opportunism, and point to the need for socialization efforts if socialization could curb partner 
opportunism. In terms of less costly efforts, Anderson and Jap (2005) suggest increased contact 
between the partners, monitoring, regular evaluations, and sound communication. 
The poorest choice seems to be merely trusting the cooperating sales agent, without 
actually increasing the interaction between exchange partners. Anderson and Jap (2005) provide 
evidence that trust, as perceived by the exporting company is an unreliable and even false 
barrier to opportunistic behavior among sales subsidiary employees, if the exporting partner 
does not also increase learning and socialization.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The present study contains a theoretical framework that proposes performance 
ambiguity and opportunism as inhibiting dimensions of international relationships, with 
possible deteriorating effects on export performance for sales agents, which somewhat limits 
the applicability of results at the firm level. For example, the study examines the overall effect 
on export performance, not specifying the product category involved in the exporting, or the 
principal firm’s resources. Goods-dominated product categories may entail less performance 
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ambiguity than more complex services. Firms that are better endowed with resources could 
prove to experience fewer evaluation problems with a foreign sales agent. Future research 
should include these dimensions, as well as others which affect possible antecedents of 
performance ambiguity or opportunism. 
The present study focuses on a limited number of inhibiting drivers of export 
performance, because of trade-off decisions in the research design, aiming at core dimensions 
possibly curbing export performance. Although the restricted number of constructs included 
takes no account of other determinants and measures of export performance, restricting the 
number of variables to a few core dimensions supported by theory actually increases the value 
of the study. 
The population of exporting Norwegian firms comprises small and medium-sized firms, 
and the results may not apply to larger exporting firms. In addition, the cross-sectional survey 
conducted in our study does not identify or consider the impact of relationship history. The 
influence of performance ambiguity and opportunism on export performance only reflects 
associative relationships and not causal ones. A longitudinal research design would clarify such 
causal interconnectedness between the core constructs. 
Performance ambiguity and the underlying challenge of information asymmetry, merit 
more attention in future research. Further investigation of dimensions reducing or increasing 
performance ambiguity, would expand our knowledge of how relationship drivers affect export 
performance. For example, Johansson and Vahlne (1977) argue that experiential knowledge 
acquired by the exporting company may reduce uncertainty, entailing improved export 
performance.  
Johansson and Vahlne (1977) distinguish between two types of experiential knowledge, 
namely general and market-specific knowledge. General knowledge relates to all foreign 
partner relationships, regardless of the country in question. For example, there is knowledge of 
marketing methods in various foreign markets, and knowledge of common characteristics of 
sales agents and types of customer, which may improve exporter ability to assess sales agent 
performance and to reduce information asymmetry.  
On the other hand, market-specific knowledge may also reduce information asymmetry 
(perhaps even more so). This knowledge might relate to business networks, specific customers, 
or the particular culture. Acquiring such knowledge would enhance exporter ability to evaluate 
sales agent performance in that specific market, potentially reducing the evaluation problem. 
General and market-specific knowledge should be included in further studies as possible 
moderating factors in the posited inter-relationships between the dimensions included in this 
study. Increased exporter knowledge may influence the impact of performance ambiguity on 
opportunism and market performance, as well as the extent to which opportunistic sales agent 
behavior affects market performance. 
The present study does not measure the interdependence between exporter and foreign 
sales agent, which may influence the potential for opportunism, and the extent to which 
opportunistic behavior affects export performance. The role of interdependence between 
exchange partners across borders is worth pursuing in future research. For example, Katsikeas 
et al. (2009) provide no consistent results in relation to how interdependence affects the 
influence of trust on export performance across different groups.  As well as influencing the 
level of trust between partners, interdependence between exporters and foreign sales agents 
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may influence a sales agent’s inclination to behave opportunistically. Increased perceived 
interdependence may curb the agent’s tendency towards opportunistic behavior. 
The present sample comprises mainly small companies in Norway from various 
exporting industries. As argued by Morgan et al. (2004), a multi-industry sample of this kind 
increases the generalizability of the results. Even so, further research might consider larger 
exporting companies using foreign sales agents as a direct mode of export. Larger exporting 
firms may have more knowledge and experience of exporting through foreign sales agents and 
of market conditions abroad, which may influence their perceptions of performance ambiguity 
and of opportunistic behavior among sales agents.  
In framing contingencies and control, Ouchi (1979) clarifies the nature of performance 
ambiguity by referring to two dimensions that may also underlie exporter difficulties in 
evaluating sales agent performance; knowledge of the transformation process (procedural 
knowledge) and ability to measure outputs (outcome measurability). A lack of procedural 
knowledge and difficulties in outcome measurability may contribute to difficulties in assessing 
sales agent performance and to a misdirection of efforts, or to an insufficient provision of 
support in the relationship with foreign sales agents. Future research should take a closer look 
at which of these dimensions (lack of procedural knowledge or outcome measurability) 
contributes most to the evaluation problem. A clarification of their relative importance and 
internal logic would contribute to management practice by helping exporters to adjust to the 
context in which sales agents (or other independent intermediaries) operate. Future research 
should also consider the sales agent’s operating environment, including market volatility, 
psychic distance, service properties, and task characteristics, thus contributing further to 
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